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Post-Copenhagen Negotiation Issues and the
North-South Divide1
John Whalley2
Sean Walsh3
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we discuss the negotiating issues that exist post-Copenhagen,
both from the Copenhagen Accord and remaining from pre-Copenhagen in
the current global negotiations aimed at achieving new climate change
mitigation and other arrangements after 2012. These negotiations were
initiated in Bali in December 2007 and are currently anticipated to conclude
by the end of 2010 in Mexico under the auspices of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and, following the
Kyoto Protocol, are effectively the second round in ongoing global
negotiations on climate change.
First, we describe these negotiations as matters stand post-Copenhagen
and discuss some of the major negotiating issues. In so doing, we focus on
the progress that is likely to be made in these negotiations, particularly
relative to the Copenhagen Accord and what was agreed to in Kyoto. We
highlight the imprecision of the negotiating mandate and also the relative
lack of clear drivers moving negotiators towards a firm conclusion to the
post-Kyoto negotiating process. In addition, we draw some comparisons to
the case of trade negotiations.
We also identify a series of further obstacles to the negotiation that go
beyond simply the imprecision of the mandate. One is the growing pressure
for additional measures to accompany global climate change agreements,
particularly in the area of trade. This is a central issue for large population,
low-wage, rapidly growing countries, whose emissions are also increasing
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in step with their economic growth (such as China, India, Brazil, and South
Africa) and may tie in with their participation in the negotiating process.
Another difficulty to the negotiations is the inclusion of particularly
vulnerable states such as southern states in Africa and small island nations.
The current climate goals are a major point of contention for Africa’s
southern states who face the risk of desertification as well as for small
island nations who face the prospect of being swallowed up by rising sea
levels, as the global 2 degrees Celsius limit on temperature increase
proposed still means 3.5 degrees Celsius to 5 degrees Celsius of
temperature rise in particularly sensitive areas such as Africa or the Arctic.
For these matters, a more precise interpretation of “common yet
differentiated responsibilities,” the imprecise and vague principle which
was agreed to in Kyoto, will be central to the post-Copenhagen negotiations
if a substantive agreement based on the Copenhagen Accord is to come out
of Mexico in November–December 2010. This principle is the single largest
obstruction to a new climate change treaty and is, in broad terms, the focal
point of the divide between the northern developed countries and the
southern developing countries on the climate change issue.
We also look at the seemingly inevitable backlog in 2012 of unfulfilled
commitments from the Kyoto negotiation 4 and an effective absence of
dispute resolution in Kyoto and hence the need for enforcement
mechanisms, post-Kyoto, that are much more effective than those that
currently exist within the Protocol. While these backlogs were seemingly
dealt with in the recent Copenhagen Accord, the agreement is not legally
binding and does not deal with enforcement in any substantive way; hence
there is little incentive to comply. Dealing with both issues at once is a
major unresolved issue.
Whether the obstacles we identify prove overwhelming, resulting in only
a reworded Copenhagen Accord-type document, or whether substantial
progress can be made in the current timeframe for the negotiation, depends
upon a number of factors related to background issues. One is whether a
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perception of growing severity of climate change (increased speed of melt
of Arctic sea ice, glacial melt, and other such phenomena) adds enough
momentum to existing political pressures to conclude the negotiation.
Another is the strength of the collective desire by most of the parties to the
negotiation to underpin international cooperation more broadly and in other
areas (such as trade) with a successful environmental negotiation. There is
also a likely perceived penalty that nonparticipant regions and countries
may face in other areas such as trade, which will also add momentum. A
further key factor is the negotiating positions of the United States and the
coalition of China and India as the largest economies and global emitters for
the developed and developing countries, respectively.
Our bottom line assessment is that the task of concluding the current
climate change negotiating round—currently spanning from the Bali
meeting of the Conference of the Parties 13 (COP 13) in 2007 to the
Conference of the Parties 16 (COP 16) in Mexico, 2010—in any
satisfactory way for both the climate and the key parties involved seems, at
this stage, daunting. In addition, the mechanisms to be used to move
negotiations forward, as well as the more precise negotiating issues
involved, seem disturbingly ill-defined and vague for a negotiation of this
scope. To compound the problem, these issues have not progressed any
further with the recent Copenhagen Accord approach which allows for
unilateral commitments to stand as international commitments—
commitments which are myriad in form, thereby making progress difficult
to measure.
We conclude with a discussion of what may be involved in negotiations
beyond the current negotiating round and suggest that, de facto, sequential
negotiating rounds—much as has occurred in General Agreement on Tarrifs
and Trades (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) since
1997—are underway. If past trade negotiations are any precedent, there will
likely be a progressive broadening of coverage of negotiations sequentially
from round to round. How to broaden beyond the current climate change
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negotiating round will thus be a central issue, and the nature of countries’
participation in current negotiations will be influenced by where they see
the process going beyond 2012—whether there will be a binding postKyoto treaty or not, and various other factors.
Another set of issues will involve growing links to other negotiating areas
including trade and finance. We suggest that, eventually, we may see the
emergence of joint bargaining simultaneously on trade, finance, and the
environment, linked within an overall regime structure. This may be a few
negotiating rounds away but raises the question of the institutional forum in
which such global bargaining might occur. For the moment, global policy
bargaining has been concentrated in the WTO and limited to trade
bargaining. With linked bargaining covering trade, finance, and the
environment, some wider bargaining format going beyond the current
structure of the WTO could emerge in the next few decades.

I. THE CURRENT STATE OF CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS
We begin a description here of the negotiations leading up to the
Copenhagen Accord and a possible post-Kyoto treaty with the widely held
belief that the Kyoto Protocol has performed unacceptably poorly. This
conclusion came through strongly at the end of the COP 11 meeting in
Montreal and in the Montreal Action Plan, which indicated a need to move
onto a new and better treaty. Serious negotiations for a post-Kyoto treaty
began formally in COP 13 in 2007, in Bali.
A. The Bali Roadmap and Its Four Pillars of Negotiation
Successful conclusion of the Bali meeting in December of 2007 seemed a
forlorn hope for most of the meeting, but in the final hours of negotiation,
several agreements were reached which effectively form what was named at
the end of the negotiation the Bali Roadmap; it lays out a broad framework
for what a post-Kyoto treaty should look like. 5 One component of the
roadmap is the creation of an Ad-hoc Working Group on Longterm
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Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG), which is to work on
issues outlined in the roadmap outside of, but parallel to, the Kyoto process
under the UNFCCC. 6 Thus, there is both an official process and a
designated group that work on the same problems.
Some key emitters, most notably the United States and China, did not
commit to any emissions reductions under Kyoto. Thus, widening the scope
of the negotiation to include as many countries as possible, and especially
high emitters, was seen as a critical need for any post-Kyoto agreement. At
the request of the United States, and as a prerequisite for their involvement,
inclusion of developing countries (and China in particular as an emitter of
carbon roughly on the same scale, year by year, as the United States) was
also deemed to be necessary to moving forward in any significant way on
the path defined by the roadmap. The United States and China would not
break this impasse and step into the process until the recent Copenhagen
Accord, two years later.
Country membership uncertainties aside, it was also alluded to in the
roadmap that industry, and specifically industry-government collaboration,
will likely play a major role in the potential success (or failure) of any
negotiated plan. The view that a one-size-fits-all approach to climate change
is inappropriate prevailed, and, hence the participation of industry leaders
was also seen as important to help design the region-specific details of any
new agreement.
The Bali Roadmap concentrates on four central pillars of future
negotiation, which define four different goals and possible actions required
for each to come about. These are (1) mitigation, (2) adaptation, (3)
innovation and technology transference, and (4) finance and investment.7
The roadmap’s design is intended to be such that activities under each pillar
support activities in one or more of the others.8
Mitigation is essentially concerned with damage minimization from
climate change. Thus, in essence, it involves balancing economic cost
versus environmental gain. The conclusion made at Bali was that the Kyoto

VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 2 • 2010

777

778 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Protocol was too simplistic in terms of country divisions for required
action. 9 A more nuanced approach to designing mitigation targets was
recommended, which will likely go beyond emissions reduction and
encompass other commitments such as energy consumption targets,
renewables targets, and others. 10 This broadening of targets is especially
relevant for the developing countries whose economies are growing rapidly
and in transition to industrialization, but this broadening of measures is also
aimed at increasing compliance with agreed targets among all participants.
The adaptation pillar is largely about changing the way that
development is viewed as a process, essentially incorporating knowledge of
the likely effects of climate change into any development or preservation
(land, biodiversity, etc.) decision. Some of this will have to do with
planning for changing weather patterns and sea-level rise of up to ten feet
by the end of this century, going by some of the more extreme estimates.
Transfer of funds to compensate for the costs of adaptation is also a major
component. At Bali, the major adaptation concern was for developing
countries, as many of these will be among the most and earliest affected.11
Country cooperation was emphasized, as necessary, to allow the emerging
effects of climate change, both detrimental and otherwise, to be identified
and dealt with.
Another set of concerns at Bali focused on technology and innovation.
The development of new and “greener” technology was seen as the longterm solution to climate change.12 At present, many diverse technologies are
being developed around the world, but the problem remains how to pick and
choose among them. Of even greater concern is how to diffuse those
technologies quickly on a global scale, especially to developing countries.
The Bali Roadmap calls for the creation of incentives to both innovate and
transfer technology and also for the removal of obstacles within countries
which retard further innovation internationally, giving specific attention to
incentives for diffusion to developing countries. Issues surrounding
intellectual property rights, technology transfer, infrastructure and the
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absorptive capacity of developing countries, and other key issues were
seemingly left for individual countries to deal with. Only recently with the
Copenhagen Accord has significant progress been made in this area, with
discussion being promised in Mexico on a new Technology Mechanism
proposed by the G77 under paragraph eleven of the Accord.13
Finally, there is the role of finance and investment, which is central to
the other three pillars, as heavy amounts of investment are required to
undertake all the actions outlined above. As potentially one of the most
vulnerable areas of climate change impacts, and also as a lynchpin for the
financing of climate change-related projects in the other three pillars,
protection of the finance and investment sector is critical. However, climate
change falls well out of the area of expertise of the sector, in general, and
hence, there is little going on within it to safeguard the sector’s continued
wellbeing from climate change effects. There is some financial innovation
being done to adapt to green initiatives and protect against climate disasters,
but the scale and progress of these efforts are almost certain to be
insufficient. While the financial map of climate change-related investment
is constantly changing, current investment levels after all international
funds are figured in are, at best, still only hundreds of billions of United
States dollars in value.14 A substantial sum, but to put that in perspective,
the International Energy Agency (IEA), in one of their 2008 books,15 has
estimated that roughly $45 trillion (or 1.1 percent of global GDP annually
out to 2050) worth of investment in new green technologies will be needed
to reach the long term goal of 50 percent emission reduction by 2050. More
recently, this has been amended to include an estimate that this figure will
rise by $500 billion for every year beyond 2010 that we do not have a
global climate regime in place.16 And, although there will undoubtedly be
beneficial spillovers if investment reaches these levels, this primarily
concerns just one of the four pillars—technology and innovation. Given this
distant goal, the primary conclusion at Bali was that, using CDMs, JI, the
ETS, and by other such means, governments must support innovation in the
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finance and investment sector and, where possible, help simplify the issues
to allow them to be more easily incorporated. Few specifics were agreed to
though, so most progress in line with these conclusions will be at the
discretion of individual countries.
Institutionally, the four pillars have been provided for. The technology
and innovation pillar has been given primarily to the Expert Group on
Technology Transfer (EGTT), a subsidiary institution of the UNFCCC, to
manage; financial matters pertaining to this pillar are handled primarily by
the Global Environment Facility (GEF).17 The GEF has also been named as
the temporary secretariat for the adaptation pillar, although several
institutions, such as the World Bank, also contribute in this area through
CDM project funding and other funds. Beyond this, the pillars of mitigation
and finance and investment are much less localized by nature, with various
institutions contributing in several ways but with no institute standing in as
a lynchpin for the ongoing efforts.
Two international funds have perhaps contributed to the centralization of
the efforts in the adaptation pillar and the technology and innovation pillar,
relative to the mitigation pillar and finance and investment pillar. These two
large funds are the Adaptation Fund, which was created under the Kyoto
Protocol mandated by the roadmap, and is managed by the GEF (hence their
current secretariat role for that pillar), and the Clean Technologies Fund
(CTF), which was created independently by the World Bank.
Comparatively, funds created for the mitigation pillar and finance and
investment pillar have received much less attention and are almost all
national or subnational in nature. These funds will be discussed in more
detail in a later section.
As a final note, the main body of the United Nations has stated, as per its
charter,18 that it will help to mediate the international conflicts that arise due
to climate change effects, such as the ongoing conflict over ownership of
the Arctic and the natural resources under the rapidly melting ice (using the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea19 in this instance). Also, while the
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World Bank’s role has been mentioned already, it has become evident that
all of the Bretton-Woods institutions are already thoroughly enmeshed in
these activities, with the IMF offering what expert advice it can to all
parties, and within the WTO, talks are ongoing as to the possibility of
integrating the international trade and environment regimes.
B. Beyond the Bali Roadmap: Poznań and the Copenhagen Accord
At Bali, it was understood that a final agreement was still out of reach by
the end of the negotiation and the goal set was set to have a new post-Kyoto
climate change treaty two years later at COP 15 in Copenhagen, set to
happen December 7 to 18, 2009. In the months preceding Copenhagen
though, this goal was again delayed twelve months by a tacit
acknowledgement that concluding in Copenhagen itself was prohibitively
difficult given the number of outstanding issues and recent developments
(the financial crisis, in particular).
The four pillars laid out at Bali are just as stated: the main part of a
roadmap, meant simply to encompass the general shape of what that final
treaty may look like. The stated purpose of COP 14 at Poznań in December
2008 and at Copenhagen itself in late 2009 was to give better definition to
what the final post-2012 agreement will ultimately be, to fill in the details
within the general shape of the Bali Roadmap, and to garner as much
support for a post-Kyoto climate change agreement as possible. However,
there were a great many issues still left to be resolved. Thus, even before
Poznań, interim discussions 20 were occurring frequently within all four
pillars. General agreement to a post-Kyoto regime is high and there are still
several outstanding issues before an agreement can feasibly be reached,
with very few having been resolved.
Most of the largest issues have to do with redefining what “common yet
differentiated responsibilities” means, which ultimately requires a
resolution to the dispute on what each of the roles of the northern developed
and southern developing countries should be in dealing with climate change.
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In other words, to what extent does development towards economic, social,
cultural, and other key goals within a country take precedence over
environmental considerations for each country? A difficult ethical question
to be sure, especially when the last few hundred years of any given
country’s history also weigh into any discussion on this question. It was not
until the recent Copenhagen Accord that a tentative answer was agreed
upon—that growth does indeed take precedence over environmental issues
in developing countries.
A significant portion of upcoming discussion and negotiation postCopenhagen will be dedicated to an ongoing attempt at resolving the
differences between the current trade regime and environmental policy, as
this is not even mentioned in the Copenhagen Accord. The differences
between the two regimes are such that some have suggested that there will
be significant challenges in integrating them.21 These differences reflect the
fact that the current international framework, centered on the BrettonWoods institutions, was not designed to take into account any possible
physical linkages between countries. Only matters pertaining to political
and economic linkages were considered key at the time of their creation in
the 1940s.
As a result, and what alarms trade specialists, environmental aims almost
inevitably seek to impose limits on trade entirely outside of the WTO
process in order to control the flow of carbon and price products. These
additional costs have no basis within the current WTO structure, save for
those few under a recognized Emissions Trading System (ETS) framework,
and tend to be classified as an unsanctioned tariff within it. Thus, trade
specialists see the emerging environmental regime as a major threat to the
continuation of the current trading regime under the WTO.
As such, to ward off a failure within one of these regimes when the
pressure becomes too much, a measure of integration would be the obvious
solution. Ultimately, this will involve a great deal of complex negotiation
on such issues as international investment, border tax adjustments, and
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embedded carbon, and thus potentially, a major shift in how the
international system works. We could see, for example, a new World
Environmental Organization emerge, which would change the dynamics of
the global system. 22 More drastically, we could see the emergence of an
entirely new global order from this negotiating process depending on the
course of global warming over time and, assuming significant progress,23
there could be a greater call for action. On one hand, the negotiations have a
great deal of progress to make and many obstacles to deal with in a limited
timeframe in order to design even a single successor treaty to Kyoto, let
alone solutions involving more drastic measures. But on the other hand, the
possibility that such drastic actions may be necessary for any effective
climate change treaty to work should not be discounted, particularly in
terms of meshing the environmental and trade regimes.
Indeed, the inherent complexity and obstacles were much in evidence in
the COP in Poznań, where some described the discussion as “treading
water” in terms of the progress made.24 Much of the discussion centered on
finance and the funds created specifically for dealing with adaptation and
mitigation efforts, with attention paid to Africa in particular, but little
progress was made with the funds still mostly unavailable for national use,
an issue impacting more strongly in the developing world than elsewhere
due to their higher adaptive needs. Although, on a positive note, there was a
seemingly large amount of support for the basic idea of climate changerelated disaster insurance, which is indicative of the level of potential
damage that negotiators currently feel climate change could cause—future
talks may bring this proposal to fruition.
Another large area of concern in Poznań was the lack of agreement as to
a “shared vision” of the type of cuts to be made under the post-Kyoto treaty.
Ultimately, this includes a lack of agreement to the scale, depth, and type of
carbon dioxide reductions needed to combat climate change and a lack of
agreement on the unknown value placed on other types of actions. There
was, however, a tentative agreement to draft a list of country-specific
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acceptable mitigation actions for later interim meetings before COP 15 at
Copenhagen. And, although there was commentary that the South seems to
be talking with a more unified voice, the large divide between the
bargaining positions of the developed and developing world remained a
clear impediment to moving the negotiation forward.
In Copenhagen itself, these divides seemed more numerous and were the
most visible obstruction to the talks. They initially became a focal point of
discussion with the revealing of an informal backroom document (prepared
by perhaps twenty to thirty developed countries), which has been dubbed
the “Danish Text.” This text dictates a plan for a flow of funds of around
$10 billion per year to developing countries out to 2012 and a timeline for
developed countries to peak their emissions. Several representatives from
developing countries called this document insufficient and dangerous for
developing country interests due to the implied control it gave the
international institutions and developed countries over the flow of funds to
developing countries and pace of climate mitigation efforts on a global scale.
In addition, South Africa and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)
bloc asserted early on the need to break away from Kyoto Protocol
commitments and to start fresh with a new protocol aiming for no more than
1.5 degrees Celsius of warming. Naturally, all countries with a Kyoto
backlog supported this idea, but most other developing countries found
throwing out the Kyoto Protocol so objectionable that they walked out of
the talks en masse for half a day—setting the precedent to allow developed
nations to abandon unmet commitments and throwing away the only
functioning international support mechanism for developing countries and
the climate change within it.25 Thus, there was little evident progress on
closing the fundamental divides between the developed and developing
countries or between the most and least affected by climate impacts during
the talks.
The final text, the Copenhagen Accord,26 committed Annex I parties with
Kyoto backlogs to extend and deepen Kyoto commitments over an eight
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year span to 2020 by an unspecified amount. For those not in this group,
mitigation plans were whatever a given country felt inclined to commit to
unilaterally, with some international oversight to guarantee sufficient effort
was being put forth.27 No country specific mitigation targets were agreed on,
and there is no mention of enforcement in the text. At the same time, a new
fund to be put in place by 2020 specifies an annual flow of $100 billion
from developed to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation
purposes and discussion of a new Technology Mechanism under the
UNFCCC to facilitate the transference of climate change adaptation/
mitigation-related technology between countries.28
Thus while much less was accomplished than some hoped, as nothing
that came out of it is legally binding, the conference was not “treading
water” again, as with the Poznań meeting. The pace of the progress is,
however, beginning to call into question whether the UN is the proper
venue for these negotiations. South Africa and the AOSIS bloc were
particularly unhappy with the result, as the fund set out in the Accord only
comes into effect in a decade and the Accord, for now,29 maintained the
status quo of a 2 degrees Celsius limit of warming, which translates to a 3.5
degrees Celsius increase in Africa, with assorted food, water, and
desertification issues associated with that, and a slower, but still probable
inundation of the small island states.

II. BROAD ISSUES FOR POST-COPENHAGEN NEGOTIATIONS
The current negotiations are the second round of global climate change
negotiations following their first initiation in Kyoto in 1997. As such, they
may be said to be parallel to the WTO negotiations that effectively began in
1947 with the creation of the GATT, with the GATT as the focal point of a
series of successive negotiating rounds which followed. As such, these
negotiations need to be seen both in their broader and more narrowly
focused perspectives. In the section that follows, we discuss more detailed
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negotiating issues needing resolution for this round to conclude with
significant content that could be built upon in future rounds.
But a number of broader considerations follow first. First and foremost is
a discussion of the driving forces behind the negotiation as they relate to its
ability to conclude. Clearly, the central issue is the perceived severity of
climate change and the potential damage associated with climate change
effects as they escalate with temperature change.
The perception of damage is critical for a meaningful conclusion to the
negotiations. In 2006, the Stern Review suggested that the business-as-usual
scenario could, by 2050, involve global damage in the region of 20 percent
of global product.30 On the other hand, authors such as Mendelsohn have
suggested that, on the basis of detailed analysis of farm-level data in the
United States and elsewhere, a more realistic estimate of damages may be
indistinguishable from zero, and Mendelsohn suggests a base-case estimate
of damages at 0.1 percent of GDP. 31 Clearly, if these latter damage
estimates are taken as central estimates, the political momentum behind
climate change negotiations for the next few decades effectively disappears.
The perception of damage is therefore key to the conclusion of the
negotiations. Those involved with the UNFCCC process, such as Yvo de
Boer, have gone as far as to suggest that the weight of scientific evidence
regarding the negative impacts from climate change is so clear that it would
be “criminal” on the part of the politicians of the major countries of the
world not to negotiate major climate change limitation.
These differences in perception, therefore, are central to the negotiation
and, for now, negotiations are being driven by committed individuals in
terms of their interpretation of the scientific evidence of climate change
within the UNFCCC process, within environmental ministries, and more
broadly, with a seemingly global political consensus of the increasing
severity of climate change. As such, for now, the political momentum
seems strong but that could change with a re-evaluation or debunking of
scientific evidence.
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Another persistent issue in the negotiations—such as those surrounding
the North-South divide—is one of momentum. As stated before, the Poznań
meeting was described as “treading water” and the progress made in
Copenhagen, while very significant for being inclusive of both the North
and South, is very fragile due to the fact that the Copenhagen Accord is not
legally binding. If things fall apart in Mexico, the danger is that the process
could be left open-ended and ultimately drag on for years, similar to the
Doha Round under the WTO. Unlike trade, however, climate change
negotiations have a definite, if unclear, window in which they may conclude
if the worst climate change effects are to be avoided; thus, the Doha pattern
is especially dangerous to follow in this case.
The other feature of broad background is the linkage between climate
change regimes and other elements of policy regimes. Climate change
negotiations, up till now, have been treated as separate, stand-alone
negotiations designed to remedy a problem with an emerging climate
regime, which can largely evolve independently of the rest of the policy
regime. The reality, however, is that the form and scope of social
engineering implied by the kinds of changes that were first brought up as
part of the Bali mandate are such that every element of economic policy,
both within and across countries, will be touched by it in ways that would
greatly complicate climate change negotiation. The Copenhagen Accord
covers this in very broad strokes: by only agreeing to the general principle
that technology disbursement will play a big part and that funding will be
provided for climate change-adaptive efforts in developing countries. But
issues related to this are already arising centrally in the trade area. There are
pressures which have been building in Europe to deal both with so-called
“leakage”: that is, one group of countries reducing their emissions and this
reduction thereby serving to facilitate increases in emissions elsewhere, but
more centrally to deal with the anticompetitive effects and costs inflicted on
domestic producers associated with significant carbon emissions
limitation.32 In Europe, this has led to calls for border tax adjustments and
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accompanying measures to supplement the climate change discussions, as
well as calls to reduce the carbon emissions limitations themselves for key
industries. 33 Climate change, however, reaches far and wide into every
dimension of global policy.
It is implicit in the text of the Copenhagen Accord that there is much
attention being paid to burden sharing and the distributional implications of
climate change initiatives. However, the text remains vague and is mostly in
terms of general support, through the creation of a new Copenhagen Green
Climate Fund, rather than in terms of the specific potential climate disasters
that may occur. For example, the forty-three AOSIS small island states who
risk disappearance under major sea-level rise spoke in Copenhagen on their
specific issue. In West Africa, there are a large number of small countries
with borders running parallel to the ocean and with increased desertification.
Thus, there would be need for major movement of individuals across
borders. It has been argued that these are poor countries that would be
unwilling and unable to accept such large influxes of refugees without
major commitments of foreign aid committed to them in advance on a
contingent basis. Such contingent negotiations could therefore involve a
major realignment of global aid arrangements. And with aid flows currently
running at 0.2 percent of GDP from the United States and other OECD
countries, seemingly massive adjustments in global aid arrangements would
necessarily follow, perhaps utilizing climate change funds as a channel.
However, current funds do not target disaster management, only general
mitigation and adaptation projects. This issue remains to be addressed, with
South Africa being the obvious choice to lead the discussion on this issue in
Mexico due to its vulnerability and stance in Copenhagen.
Trade arrangements would be central in terms of maintaining access to
key export markets, particularly for rapidly growing emerging economies.
China is a case in point, with 30 percent export growth and a development
strategy focused centrally on integration into the global economy, growing
industrialization, and trade. One major concern in China is with the world
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going both “green” and “protectionist” at the same time. Climate change
negotiations could involve a closing of global markets to them. Therefore,
from China’s point of view, linking trade and climate change negotiations is
central in the sense that China may be more willing to take on firmer
climate change commitments in return for guarantees of market access.
Also, since India formed a five-year coalition with China in 2009, India has
officially taken up this stance.34
Global financial markets and the global financial structure will also be
altered by the reallocation of risk in light of growing climate change
scenarios. Issues of creating climate change-specific financial mechanisms
such as global warming or global flooding bonds and so on would inject a
new element into global financial arrangements, which could rapidly
overwhelm the structure of the financial system as it exists now.
In all these ways, the broadening of the focus of climate arrangements is
therefore a large element of this negotiation process, both in terms of global
efficiency and distributional impacts, as well as the allocation of risk and
the linkage to other countries. How this broadening of focus is built into the
Mexico negotiation and beyond will be key to the process.
The ability to conclude this negotiation, therefore, will be driven in part
by the broader context in which the negotiation takes place. The momentum
behind the negotiation will be such that it may force some form of
conclusion if the current perception of the growing severity of climate
change damage continues. With weaker perceptions that things will change,
the complications and difficulties associated with linkage will come into
play. Likewise, a clear timeline for the negotiation is also necessary due to
the negotiation’s complexity.

III. SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATING ISSUES POST-COPENHAGEN
In this section, we set out our sense of some of the key negotiating issues
that will arise for the Mexico negotiation. We discuss this through a series
of topic subheadings.
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A. Defining a Possible Agreement
Several issues remain surrounding the basic characteristics of what the
agreement could be. One of these issues concerns the timeframe and the
base date for the negotiation and the commitments which would be
undertaken as a result of the negotiation.
In terms of the timeframe, at the moment it is only tentatively specified
how long commitments undertaken in 2012 will apply—out to 2020—and
only for countries in noncompliance with Kyoto. However, those countries
in compliance or those that did not take on commitments in Kyoto will
likely follow suit. But the actual timeframe decided on makes a big
difference, particularly for the rapidly growing economies. Whether this is
ten, fifteen, twenty years or even longer could impact greatly on their plans
for economic growth and other goals.
A central issue related to this discussion is deciding on the base date for
the calculation of commitments. In Kyoto, Russia’s agreement to participate
gave the negotiations the momentum to conclude, and this Russian
agreement was heavily influenced by the decision to make 1990 the base
date. Fixing 1990 as the base date allowed Russia to trivially meet its
agreed Kyoto commitments since between 1990 and 1997 there had been an
implosion of the Russian economy. Even today, Russia is still significantly
below its 1990 emissions levels.
As a result, in the current negotiation, the Russian position has been one
of emphasizing how central it is to Russian participation that these
negotiations maintain a base date as close to 1990 as possible for any
emissions calculations. The choice of the base date may be more important
for Russia than the choice of negotiating instrument.
On the other hand, for an economy such as China which is rapidly
growing, the use of a base date of 1990 would be disastrous, due to the
growth which has occurred since that time. The Chinese incentive is to have
as recent a base date as possible. The conflict over these base dates and
timeframes, therefore, remains a central unresolved issue in the negotiations.
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The concept of multiple base dates has been suggested as a solution;
however, this would make comparisons on progress in emissions reduction
more difficult.
Paired with the issue of the base date is the issue of the depth of the
commitments for carbon dioxide emissions within a post-Kyoto agreement.
With the levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere still on the rise, the
required cuts to stay within the threshold of a 2 degrees temperature
increase from 1990 levels, as indicated by the reports of the IPCC, are
constantly increasing. Even a year ago, the limit for carbon reduction that
governments were willing to consider was a 50 percent cut by 2050. In most
places this has been discarded as too weak now, and it is fairly common for
declarations of 80 percent (or more) reduction targets by 2050 to be made
by various countries. The Waxman-Markey Bill in the United States, for
example, sets out an 83 percent reduction target for 2050. Largely, this is
largely a reflection of the direness of the problem as perceived through the
lens of the IPCC reports, the 2006 Stern Review, and other widely read
sources supporting the science of climate change. As time goes on, if the
viewpoint in these reports continues to hold sway, the range of cuts under
consideration will likely continue to remain high and possibly even rise
further. Thus, the depth and time frame for such cuts that will be agreed to
in the post-Kyoto negotiating process will depend on the perceived severity
of climate change at the time and whether the science behind such reports
continues to hold up against scrutiny.
On the other hand, there is the feasibility of actually reaching such targets.
IEA projections, as stated before, put the price of the necessary innovation
and technological diffusion (primarily through investment in the energy
sector) at $45 trillion, with yearly delays on a global treaty beyond 2010
increasing that amount by another $500 billion. Eventually, there may even
come a point at which the cost of acting does indeed outweigh the cost of
inaction, although such a scenario is hardly desirable. To an extent, this line
of thought also underlies the political will towards reaching an agreement as
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soon as possible. The science states clearly that there is a limited window of
opportunity in which an effective and feasible global climate change
agreement can be made and realized by 2050, although the bounds of which
remain uncertain.
Another issue is the form of the commitments within the agreement. If an
agreement is to be reached by the Mexico meeting of the COP at the end of
2010, how much emphasis should be placed on emissions reduction, and
how much on other possible actions? The REDD plus plan35 for forestry is
already included in the Copenhagen Accord. Similar policies focused on
biodiversity and several others that go beyond the central carbon dioxide
reduction issue also exist and could potentially be created to be more
effective in the long term. The four key pillars defined earlier in the Bali
Roadmap remain a good blueprint for a post-Kyoto treaty, and ideally, each
should receive a significant amount of attention in any final agreement.
In addition, complications are arising in the negotiating process due to
the fact that countless countries have already been engaged in unilateral
projects to combat and prepare for climate change outside of their Kyoto
Protocol commitments. For example, a number of economies, such as the
European Union (EU) and China, have unilaterally committed themselves
to significant emissions reductions relative to trend (instead of absolute
levels) by 2020. The EU has committed itself to a 20–20–20 program—to
achieve a 20 percent reduction in emissions and a 20 percent use of
renewables by 2020. In the case of China, there is a 20 percent reduction in
energy consumption relative to GDP, a 20 percent use of renewables, and a
45 percent reduction of emissions relative to GDP, also by 2020. This issue
arose centrally in the Copenhagen negotiation and, at the moment, the
Copenhagen Accord states, at least for those without unfulfilled Kyoto
commitments, that these unilateral actions are, de facto, being treated as the
multilateral commitments of these countries. 36 How effective this sort of
approach is over a less ad hoc approach remains to be seen.
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B. Common Yet Differentiated Responsibility
The first issue for the ongoing negotiating round is the participation, as
well as the terms for participation, of large, rapidly growing, low-wage
economies—especially China, but also India and Brazil. These countries did
not participate in the Kyoto negotiations, and now the pressure is on for
them to be included, especially China since it is now the largest emitter of
carbon globally on an annual basis.37 History was made in the Copenhagen
Accord in that it includes both developed and developing countries;
however, their inclusion is only in a sort of de facto way since the accord is
not legally binding, allowing them to set their own targets using whatever
instruments they want. Ideally, these countries should have a deeper
involvement given the emissions levels and mitigation potential embodied
in them. But deeper involvement in the form of a legally binding treaty may
prove more troublesome in trying to achieve such a wide membership.
China, India, and Brazil have a special situation to deal with in terms of
their negotiating positions. First of all, they are rapidly growing and have
aspirations of growth and development both for the purposes of poverty
alleviation as well as for significant improvement in the level of wellbeing
within their economies. In order to achieve this, any negotiated
commitments by them in the climate change area have to allow them room
to grow, as agreed to in the accord.38 In the Kyoto negotiations, this was
implicitly recognized with the adoption of the ill-defined principle of
“common yet differentiated responsibilities,” originating from the
UNFCCC mandate.
In Kyoto, this phrase was widely interpreted to imply that developing
countries would not be subject to any commitments in terms of emissions
reductions within the Kyoto negotiation and all emissions reductions would
be made by OECD economies. “Common yet differentiated,” therefore,
meant nonparticipation by developing countries. In the current negotiation
process, this interpretation seems no longer capable of prevailing, both
because of the current emissions from these economies and their rapid
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growth. Hence, major debate and discussion took place in Copenhagen over
the interpretation of this term and what its significance is for these
economies. For the moment, the Copenhagen Accord states that developing
nation responsibility is whatever the developing nations feel unilaterally
inclined to implement—not so far a stretch from what was already
occurring under the Kyoto Protocol.39
As far as “common yet differentiated responsibilities” go, two different
interpretations circulate, each of which has major implications for the
negotiation. One is the definition embodied in the Copenhagen Accord, that
developing countries, and rapidly growing economies in particular, should
not be expected to take on commitments in terms of climate change and
emissions reductions which impinge adversely on their growth and
development (until they achieve developmental levels comparable to those
in the OECD economies), save in the case that they are financially
compensated for doing so. The magnitude of financial compensation that
was discussed in Copenhagen went far beyond any previous climate change
funds. Previous funds, such as the Clean Technology Fund, sized at $30
billion, and the Adaptation Fund, which provides an annual flow of funds
only in the hundreds of millions, pale beside the size of funds embodied in
the accord. This proposed fund, the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund, if
implemented, would provide $100 billion annually starting in 2020 to
developing countries for general climate related project funding.
The second interpretation is one where “common yet differentiated
responsibilities” refers to the form of commitment which is undertaken.
China, India, and Brazil have all suggested that the post-Kyoto negotiating
process should focus on reductions in emissions intensity rather than
reductions in emissions levels for developing countries, as this would allow
more room for them to grow. Therefore, one possible interpretation of
“common yet differentiated responsibilities” is China, India, and Brazil
would take on commitments in terms of emissions intensity, whereas the
OECD would take on commitments in terms of emissions levels—i.e., the
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“common yet differentiated responsibility” translates to differential
commitments undertaken by different groups of countries.
The treatment of unilateral measures as international measures in the
accord will likely facilitate the use of these different measurements by
different countries. However, whether this approach will continue to prevail
at the Mexico negotiation, and whether or not it is found to produce
sufficient reduction in emissions, is an open question. This is a very central
issue for the participation of these large entities as well as climate-sensitive
countries such as South Africa in climate change negotiations beyond
Copenhagen.
C. Choice of Negotiating Instruments
A second set of issues for the negotiation focus on negotiating
instruments. The negotiations which concluded in Kyoto involved
commitments to reductions in emissions relative to a specified base date.
Almost certainly, the rapidly growing economies of China, India, and Brazil
would be unwilling to take on commitments on this basis. This is simply
because of their rapidly growing economies; to leave room for their growth,
commitments of this sort are inconsistent with their growth aspirations. In
the eleventh five-year plan in China in 2005, China set out their clear
objective to quadruple real GDP per capita between 2000 and 2020. A
restatement of that objective between 2020 and 2040 and then continued
growth after 2050 would apply a thirty-fold increase in GDP per capita,
with concurrent large increases in emissions (independent of the adoption of
more emissions-compatible technologies in that span that could mitigate
some consequences).
Such growth profiles will clearly continue to argue that any negotiations
should take place on the basis of emissions intensity rather than emissions
levels. Thus, one central issue in the negotiations is the choice of instrument,
along with the issue of whether a common instrument will be used for all
parties to the negotiation. These details remain to be worked out in Mexico.
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Another related issue, and one not explicitly covered in the Copenhagen
Accord, concerns the calculation of liability for emissions reduction and
whether it should be related to the use of fossil fuels on a geographical or
territorial basis, effectively looking at emissions associated with an
economy’s production, or whether it should be the consumption within the
economy. China, for instance, has argued that approximately 35 percent of
China’s carbon emissions are related to exports. These exports represent the
consumption of entities outside China, both in the OECD and elsewhere,
and these emissions should therefore be the liability of the entities which
enjoy consumption of the goods which are produced, not the liability of
China simply because of the geography involved in their production. This is
an especially large issue for China since China is rapidly becoming the
manufacturing center for the world with nearly 60 percent of Chinese GDP
now originating in the manufacturing sector.
The calculation of liability for emissions reduction also raises complex
issues of administration and implementation. Were agreements to be made
in terms of consumption rather than production as a basis for the calculation
of emissions reduction, there would have to be agreements on the
calculation of the carbon content and the administration of any carbon
content rules. These rules, in turn, would be very complex since they would
relate not only to the amount of carbon directly embodied in the production
of goods, but also the carbon involved indirectly, and components for
production would originate in third countries, with multiple shipments
between different pairs of countries in the production process. Current
estimates calculate the manufacturing sector in China at around 55–60
percent of the total value of production of foreign direct investment (FDI)related activities for export as related to import; that is, the processing trade
in these economies is very large and would have to be reflected in these
carbon basis calculations. Hence, a further issue arising with embedment is
the basis for the calculation of carbon content.40
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D. A Backlog of Unfulfilled Commitments
Yet another issue central to the negotiation process is the backlog of
unfulfilled commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, which apply to a
significant number of OECD economies. Arguably, the most severe case is
Canada, where some current projections insist that Canada could be 30
percent (over 150 million tons of carbon dioxide) beyond their Kyoto
commitment targets by 2012.41
One issue presented by these backlogs is the credibility of any
future negotiating arrangement. It also raises the issue of the enforcement
and dispute settlement mechanisms within negotiated arrangements. In
Kyoto and in Copenhagen, only a marginal amount of time was devoted to
crafting enforcement mechanisms (which have proved to be largely
insufficient), and several parties in the negotiation process are insistent that
much more effective dispute settlement mechanisms be applied. Finally, it
has also had the effect of dividing the negotiating parties effectively into
two groups. The first group includes those parties that did not participate in
the first negotiating round (China, India, Brazil), did not ratify their
commitments (United States), or trivially met their commitments (Russia).
These countries will be pitted in a coalition against the second group:
countries that are significantly in violation of their compliance to Kyoto
commitments. In Copenhagen itself, the pressure was on countries to honor
their unfulfilled Kyoto pledges as part of the negotiating process going
forward beyond 2012, and they were included in the Copenhagen Accord as
being carried forward. Hence, the prospect is for a group of countries, of
whom Canada is the most severe, to carry forward with them their
unfulfilled commitments from Kyoto as well as any further negotiated cuts
which they undertake as part of a final post-Kyoto deal.
Should a final agreement be reached, a modified Kyoto Protocol will
likely play a large part, as developed countries would not accept a waiver of
Kyoto commitments as part of a post-Kyoto agreement in Copenhagen. This
is a central issue particularly as it relates to the issue of dispute settlement.
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While countries agreed to carry unfulfilled commitments forward in the
Copenhagen Accord, this is not legally binding. When the issue arises again
in Mexico, should the push be for a legally binding treaty, many non-Kyoto
compliant countries will likely argue against the prospect of carrying these
forward.
E. Accompanying Measures and Spillovers Beyond the Environmental
Regime
While not explicitly stated in the official documents, there are growing
pressures in the discussion for there to be accompanying measures which
would be introduced alongside the new set of commitments reached so as to
allow easier implementation of the commitments. These pressures arise
explicitly in the area of trade. For now, these issues have most centrally
been debated with respect to Europe, but the discussions are beginning to
spread. The catalyst behind them in the European case is not only the
prospect of a new international regime in 2012 beyond Kyoto, but also the
impending changes in the European emissions trading system. From 2012,
the EU system will move from a partial cap-and-trade system, where
existing producers receive an allocation of rights to emit carbon comparable
to their current use, with a requirement to buy additional permits, to one in
which there is significantly more auctioning of permits so that producers
will have to buy permits for most carbon emissions. 42 This potentially
generates significant new cost pressures for European producers and has
been the source of much discussion over proposed border tax adjustments in
Europe, which will accompany these new arrangements. In addition, the
pressures are building for the same border tax adjustment issues to be
debated as part of the post-Kyoto negotiating process.
In essence, the argument is that if certain economies view themselves as
going farther and faster in terms of environmental commitments than others,
this imposes a cost disadvantage on their domestic producers. In order to
implement these carbon emissions reductions measures, it will be necessary
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to offset the competitive disadvantages to domestic producers and this will
be done through accompanying trade measures. Current proposals in the EU
call for systems of tariffs and exports subsidies to compensate both
domestic competition and exporters for these border adjustments.
Many issues are raised by these border adjustments including, as in the
recent paper by Lockwood and Whalley, the issue of the effectiveness of
such measures and whether they will indeed offset the competitive
disadvantages.43 The pressure in the negotiation process, however, will be
for these types of accompanying measures to be allowed. These, in turn,
will likely involve measures not in compliance with WTO tariff bindings,
and hence build conflict between the environmental regime and the trade
regime.
There are also fledgling discussions of various arrangements in the trade
area in the form of new regional arrangements. Proposals are beginning to
come forward for carbon-free trade areas, which might involve tariff and
other reductions for the trade of low-carbon products and also the use of
accompanying measures along the lines of border tax adjustments for
groupings of countries.
All of these proposals and accompanying measures in the financial area
may well arise. They reflect the pressures that will inevitably build for the
crossovers between the new emerging environmental regime, the trade
regime in the WTO, and the financial regime implicitly underwritten by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to be considered as one single-linked
entity. In essence, the global policy regime, in terms of policy coordination
linking economies which, coming out of the Bretton-Woods Conference of
the 1940s, was seen as only involving trade in goods and links in finance,
will inevitably be broadened to also include physical interaction between
economies. The discussion of regimes for their physical interaction cannot
logically take place independently of the trade and finance regimes and this
is now reflected in the pressures occurring in the accompanying measures.
No mention of accompanying measures (or indeed, any trade related
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matters) is made in the Copenhagen Accord, and it remains as a further
unresolved issue.
F. The Size and Administration of Accompanying Funds
Here we outline the climate change related funds already put into
operation and the current plans for a new fund within the Copenhagen
Accord. As we note above, the post-Bali Roadmap calls for explicit
negotiations on both adaptation and innovation funds. The Adaptation
Fund44 was mandated in the Bali Roadmap, and funds for the other three
pillars—mitigation, innovation and technology transference, and finance
and investment—have rapidly emerged from various sources, notably the
World Bank’s relatively new Clean Technology Fund (CTF)45 and Strategic
Climate Fund (SCF). 46 These two, in addition to the other World Bank
administrated climate change funds, currently amount to a flow of roughly
$20 billion annually, which constitutes the majority of fully operational
international climate change investment funds (although much of it is
already dedicated to ongoing projects).
In comparison, the next two largest sources—the officially mandated
Adaptation Fund and the climate change investment program of the InterAmerican Development Bank—are relatively small. The Adaptation Fund’s
value, while somewhat uncertain (since it is based on the successes of CDM
projects), is worth at least $160 million annually and at best $960 million
annually.47 The climate change investment program of the Inter-American
Development Bank, on the other hand, accounts for funds of roughly $6.6
billion annually for various climate change projects.48
These funds are seen as facilitating individual countries’ and economies’
adaptation to predicted climate change effects as well as financing the
emergence of new technologies to deal with these effects and mitigate
carbon emissions. Inevitably however, this means that the climate change
negotiating process is, in effect, a negotiation on simultaneous emissions
reductions, requiring instruments and depth of commitments to be
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negotiated alongside financial arrangements. This negotiation will likely
involve significant financial transfers between countries and will be critical
to maintaining the participation of the developing countries in the postKyoto negotiating process due to the costs involved and their stated priority
on growth and poverty alleviation over environmental protectionism.
As we note above, for the low-wage, rapidly growing economies,
“common yet differentiated responsibilities” suggests financial
compensation for environmental restraint should be part of the negotiations.
Furthermore, these parties see the funds that are specified as part of the
Copenhagen Accord to be the most in accordance with their sense of how
much extra cost environmental action will impose on their economies.
Therefore, both the size and use of the funds, the proposed $100 billion per
year, and the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund in particular, will therefore
be a central element in the negotiation going forward.
G. Other Issues in the Negotiation
Along with the issues we note above, other more peripheral issues will
likely arise in the negotiation. Two issues of particular interest are
enforcement/dispute settlement and the coalitional structure that will likely
emerge throughout the negotiating process. While individually these issues
are perhaps less central than those we discuss above, they will take on
special significance as they interact with the major negotiating issues
identified.
1. Enforcement and Dispute Settlement
The first significant issue that is likely to arise is enforcement and dispute
settlement. Kyoto’s enforcement mechanisms have proven largely
inadequate; and the need for more effective enforcement mechanisms will
undoubtedly motivate research as to what these mechanisms could involve,
particularly if Kyoto is largely carried forward intact past 2012 as proposed
by the developing countries in Copenhagen itself.49 One mechanism could
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be a precommitment by negotiating parties to give funds to a central entity,
such as an international agency, where they would be held in escrow
pending compliance with negotiated commitments. This could include an
arrangement where countries in noncompliance would not receive a return
of funds, and their contribution would be distributed among compliant
countries in a manner proportionate to GDP or geographic size. The size of
such a fund would have to be large in order to have an effective dispute
settlement mechanism. Also, procedures would have to be specified to
determine country compliance at the end of the agreement period. Such a
mechanism, however, would seemingly (and inevitably) be a part of both
the negotiation and an implementable scheme.
2. Coalitions in the Climate Change Negotiation Process
A final issue concerns the evolution of coalitions, the negotiating form,
and how coalitions can evolve and negotiate within this structure. The
typical GATT/WTO trade negotiations have been dominated by large
entities. Typically, outcomes are communicated to small entities later on in
the negotiating process, and their negotiating commitments are extended
through the Most Favored Nation principle (MFN) to the smaller parties.
This has effectively allowed a structure to evolve in the trade area where the
larger countries, through negotiating rounds, have undertaken more
significant commitments. These are then extended by MFN to the smaller
parties who, to a large degree, free ride on the multilateral commitment.
In the environmental area, the emerging coalitional structure is quite
different and will come into play in a central way. What remains to be seen
is how it will operate in terms of modalities of negotiation and whether it
will significantly affect the outcomes of the negotiations. There is already a
coalition of forty-three small, independent island states—the Alliance of
Small Island States (AOSIS)—who negotiate together, with South Africa
commonly taking their side informally. A smaller but potentially much
more significant coalition consisting of India and China has also emerged,
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where both of these countries have agreed to take identical negotiating
positions in climate negotiations out to 2014. The negotiating interests of
Russia and Brazil are also clearly aligned with India and China, and a
broadening of this latter coalition may be likely, which, as a group of
developing countries accounting for a significant amount of annual global
carbon dioxide emissions, would give it considerable leverage in the
negotiation.
The ultimate coalitional structure that emerges throughout this process
may or may not aid the conclusion of the negotiations. In theory, more
coalitions would equate to fewer parties with opposing positions in the
negotiations, which in turn, should lead to a faster resolution and conclusion.
This basic assessment, however, fails to factor in the relative inexperience
of all parties to the negotiation in environmental issues. Furthermore, as
scientific facts emerge and are reassessed, the stability of some of these
coalitions may come into question, especially as the perception of an
increasing (or decreasing) threat posed by climate change to any specific
geographic region changes over time (AOSIS countries versus mainland
countries, for example). On the other hand, this may be partially mitigated if
such coalitions are also tied to some other less mercurial and more familiar
international areas that will play a central role in the negotiation, such as
trade.
Negotiations may be facilitated if these key negotiating coalitions emerge
and if negotiations take place between groups of countries, such as between
the OECD and between India and China or between the OECD and the G77.
However, these developments may also complicate negotiations due to the
difficulty of obtaining and retaining common coalitional positions. On the
other hand, it could also be the case that the negotiations are far too
complex to conclude in a timely manner without an established coalitional
structure.
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IV. CAN THE POST-KYOTO NEGOTIATING ROUND CONCLUDE WITH
SIGNIFICANT CONTENT?
In this section, we discuss potential scenarios for the conclusion of the
current climate change negotiating round and identify both obstacles to and
facilitators for successful negotiations. This negotiation has a very short
timeframe and is currently operating under a twelve-month extension from
its originally planned conclusion in Copenhagen 2009. Further, its current
negotiating mandate remains somewhat imprecise. 50 The negotiation is
being conducted largely within UN agencies, which have limited experience
in international negotiation and whose reach into international bureaucracies
is largely with environmental agencies, rather than trade, where there is an
accumulated reservoir of negotiating talent and experience. For all of these
reasons, there has been substantial skepticism in many of the circles close to
the negotiations in terms of its potential to conclude.
A. Obstacles to Negotiation
Undoubtedly, the political pressures on the negotiation will be such that
there will be some kind of an agreement with a declared outcome. Some
have suggested that any significant progress on climate change, if it occurs,
is likely to happen not within the current UN-hosted negotiation process but
within the G20 process, since the highest global emitters (on a level basis)
are concentrated within this group of twenty countries. But the obstacles to
the negotiation are still, unfortunately, many. These obstacles are the result
of a negotiating mandate that is still laid out in broad strokes and lacking in
precision, from backlogs from the previous agreement to a global
architecture not designed to include climate change issues within its
framework.
1. Imprecise Negotiating Mandate
First, the negotiating mandate is imprecise. While there is a mandate to
negotiate on emissions reductions, the instruments to be used in the
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negotiation are unclear and unresolved. This issue was put off to COP 16 in
Mexico due to the treatment of existing unilateral initiatives as a fill-in for
multilateral commitments in Copenhagen. The timeframe for the mandate is
still only tentatively decided, and only for countries carrying Kyoto
backlogs. Another issue is the interpretation of “common yet differentiated
responsibilities.”51 There are two main interpretations of this principle. The
first involves financial compensation to developing countries for
environmental restraint, and the second focuses on differing forms and
bases of commitment for reducing emissions depending on a country’s
developmental level. Obtaining agreement on this matter represents a
substantial obstacle. All of this lack of precision inevitably means that these
matters have to be resolved before a negotiation can conclude, decreasing
the chance of any significant progress in Mexico.
2. The Collective Action Problem
Second, this negotiation is, by nature, a collective action problem and the
incentive for any one individual country to participate, particularly in the
case of small countries, is minimal. That is, unless all (or most) countries
participate in the negotiation and agreement, the costs to any individual
participating country incurred by internalizing greenhouse gas emissions
and other climate change causing activities may outweigh the actual
environmental gains from doing so. Thus, any agreement reached may have
to focus more on other aspects of the four pillars set out in the Bali
Roadmap, such as the new Technology Mechanism proposed at
Copenhagen or other resources that could provide an incentive to participate,
even for smaller countries.
3. Lack of a Clear Deadline
In the trade area, negotiations typically come down to the wire, with
decisions being made in the last few days and hours. For many years, states
maneuver for position and then a last minute, frantic posturing occurs
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before deals conclude. As such, the imprecision of the mandate and the
resulting ambiguity of the subject matter of negotiation can be major factors
in preventing a successful conclusion to the negotiation. This was arguably
the case in Copenhagen. If negotiations going forward into Mexico (and
possibly beyond) continue to mimic past trade negotiations by starting from
an imprecise mandate, the end result will be similarly imprecise and
unworkable.
4. Unfulfilled Commitments
Next, if we assume a legally binding framework for a post-2012 treaty,
the backlog of unfulfilled commitments 52 presents a major difficulty and
obstacle to the negotiation because those countries and economies with a
backlog will be reluctant to take on any new commitments if any new treaty
indicates that they must still clear away their backlog as well. On the other
hand, those parties to the negotiation without backlogs will continually use
this as a major source of pressure on those economies, as seen recently in
Copenhagen.53 The choice for some of the OECD countries, such as Canada,
in accepting the backlog or not in a legally binding framework could be
more important than the commitments they take on as part of the
negotiation process itself. It is not just the presence of a backlog, but the
quantitative size of these backlogs which will further complicate the
negotiation. This has had the effect of splitting the countries in the
negotiation into those with and without backlogs, a split which is roughly
analogous to the divisions over time frames and base dates for the emissions
reduction commitments.
5. Constraints from Non-Climate Change Issues
A final difficulty is the emerging issue of accompanying measures,
particularly in the trade area such as carbon-motivated border tax
adjustments and emissions trading systems. These measures reflect the
natural and logical evolution of an emerging global policy regime, which
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not only concerns the environmental area, but explicitly links the
environment with trade. Whether or not the negotiations formally
acknowledge the linkage, it will be there, will continue to be central to
negotiations, and will grow. This linkage is such that, effectively, trade and
the environment must be linked in order to achieve a satisfactory outcome
to both negotiating processes over the long term. The impact of one
negotiation on the other will be pivotal in achieving global environmental
improvements. What these accompanying measures would be, how they
would operate, and so on, would therefore become an increasingly central
part of the post-Kyoto negotiation process going forward and would deflect
attention from the direct negotiation on emissions reduction and the use of
funds. However, the Copenhagen Accord does not mention trade at all.
Should this linkage continue to go unacknowledged, we face the prospect of
a world that could go both green and protectionist at the same time and the
accompanying difficulties associated with that.
B. Factors Driving a Successful Conclusion
In addition to the obstacles, there are significant pressures that point
towards a conclusion of the round, and it is possible that these pressures
could overcome the many obstacles identified above. These pressures are
detailed in the section that follows. Whether these pressures will force the
conclusion of the current round and produce a post-Kyoto agreement
depends upon the ability of these pressures to force outcomes on the key
issues in the negotiation highlighted previously.
1. Perception of the Severity of Climate Change
The first, and absolutely vital, factor in the negotiations is the perception
of the severity of the issue of climate change. There is a perception now,
which is widely shared in some circles, that climate change is not only a
significant problem, but that it is also growing in severity much more
rapidly than many people understand or appreciate. 54 This perception is
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based on facts and observations, such as the fact that the melting rate of
Arctic sea ice is much more dramatic than is indicated in the latest IPCC
report, and the melting rate of Arctic glaciers may now be occurring at up to
eight times the rate it was occurring ten years ago.55
These reports are indications of the popular perception of the rapidly
escalating severity of climate change issues. To the extent that this is true,
the pressure on politicians toward a successful negotiation would grow and
could lead to a more positive outcome from the current round of
negotiations. A common perception on the level of mitigation needed is the
key; and, for the most part, the world has agreed that 2 degrees of warming
is a borderline we do not want to cross, although there is some discussion of
changing this to a 1.5 degrees target following the Copenhagen meeting.56
On the other hand, if the perspectives of those who have called
themselves “climate change rationalists,” (often labeled in the media as
climate change skeptics or deniers) gain traction, there will be a disincentive
to conclude negotiations. This group of scientists exists to dissect and
analyze popular climate change works such as the IPCC reports and the
Stern Review. For the most part, they have found huge inconsistencies
between their empirical science and what the computer-generated
forecasting models highlighted in these internationally renowned reports
indicate. Depending on who you ask from this group, they argue that either
we are slowly cooling or that we are currently warming, but we have not
warmed enough or over a long enough period of time for it to be a
statistically significant event and that both the level of warming and the rate
of temperature change are still within the bounds of natural variability, as
seen by the temperature record for the past 12,000 years (since the last ice
age). If this view of climate change emerges within the current negotiating
round, then the incentives to move the negotiation to a conclusion may
decrease, especially in the area of carbon dioxide reduction initiatives,
despite indicative events to the contrary such as accelerating Arctic melt.
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2. International Policy Cooperation Outside of the Environment
A second issue moving the negotiations toward a conclusion is the clear
and growing desire on the part of many countries involved to use their
participation to underpin their global cooperational policy in terms of
national relations, trade, involvement in international institutions,
development strategy, etc. Hence, along with this arises a perceived penalty
that many countries would incur from their nonparticipation in these
international negotiations, were there to be an outcome. This seems
especially clear in China’s case. China has been following a growth and
development path since the 1990s that is fundamentally trade oriented with
a rapid export growth of 30 percent per year in recent years and large
growth of inward foreign direct investment to fuel the export growth.
China’s integration into the global economy has become the central plank of
Chinese growth. In order to maintain openness to markets abroad and
facilitate Chinese growth and development, China therefore sees it central
in her interest to be a significant and active partner in international
cooperation, including in the environmental area. Hence, China’s objectives
in the environmental area are not only environmental; they are to maintain
the openness of the trade regime. This argument applies, albeit perhaps
more weakly so, in the case of India, Brazil, and other developing
economies, and even in the case of the higher income OECD economies.
The central interest in maintaining an open policy regime in areas outside of
the environment can therefore act as a significant incentive to achieve
compliance in the environmental area.
Hence, the conclusion of the post-Kyoto negotiation round faces a whole
series of more narrowly focused and more problematic matters concerning
the imprecision of the mandate, the basic science, the backlog of
commitments, the use of accompanying measures, and the interpretation of
“common yet differentiated responsibilities” along with a host of more
positive factors, including the growing severity of the issues, the desire in
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many circles to achieve international policy cooperation in areas outside of
the environment, and the changing political landscape in the United States.

V. THE FUTURE OF CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS AND
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The conclusion of the post-Kyoto round of negotiations not only depends
on what happens in the actual negotiation itself but will also reflect the
expectation of future negotiations. The presumption, much as in the trade
regime and the GATT/WTO process, is that, through a sequence of
international negotiations stretching out over many decades, there will be a
progressive move towards a global environmental regime which will reflect
policy cooperation and coordination to deal centrally with the
internalization of externalities associated with global warming. As a result,
the post-Kyoto negotiations may rightly be viewed as only one step in a
series of sequential rounds, such as exists in the trade case. Thus, the
negotiations will depend on whether the involved parties view their
participation in the current round of negotiation as similar to participation in
trade processes. The experience in the trade arena has been that countries
that withdrew from negotiation at an early stage in the sequence then found
it difficult and problematic to re-enter this negotiating sequence—the
classic case being China, who withdrew from the GATT in 1949 and had to
undergo complex negotiations on resumption of a WTO membership
through accession concluding in 2001.
As a result, the scenarios hypothesized after the conclusion of the current
round will affect the outcome of the negotiation, especially in regard to the
timeframe of any post-2012 agreements made. This is particularly central to
the involvement of the low-wage, high-population, rapidly growing
economies such as India and China, and perhaps developing countries in
general. On the one hand, environmental restraint (through participation in
the process) will impact their growth performance and ability to achieve
their growth aspirations and millennium goals, primarily poverty reduction.
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On the other hand, noninvolvement in an international climate change treaty
could lead to environmentally motivated protectionist measures being
levied against them. The difficulty lies in finding enough common ground
with developed countries on the climate change issue that meshes with the
growth aspirations of developing countries. In other words, the “common
but differentiated responsibilities” principle remains the central point of
division between these two sets of countries. The resolution to this issue
will most likely require joint handling of environmental and trade issues,
something not seen in the recent Copenhagen Accord document. The
resolution of this issue represents the bridging of the North-South divide on
climate change, which was seen most visibly in Copenhagen, but has
existed since the inception of the “common but differentiated
responsibilities” principle. Should it be resolved, a great many possibilities
will open up.
The most likely future scenarios, using the trade experience as a
precedent, would seem to involve three central elements. The first element
is the broadening of negotiations sequentially across rounds. In the trade
area, the broadenings occurred initially from tariffs into other trade-related
instruments such as subsidies, and then, in the Uruguay Round, into a whole
series of further issues including intellectual property, agriculture, textiles,
and others. A similar broadening seems likely to occur in the global
environmental area, with other environmental issues being added to the
climate change agenda. This could include international codes on the
disposal of nuclear waste, as in the Basel Convention,57 or the linking of the
patchwork quilt of international conventions which have emerged in the
international area over the years, as identified by Whalley and Zissimos,58
and would involve perhaps 150 ad hoc treaties. Whether this would lead to
a broadened form of world environmental organizations remains to be seen.
The second element in future rounds would seemingly involve the
growing links to other elements of the international policy regime,
particularly in the trade and finance areas. The current global situation still
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reflects an institutional form in a time warp of the 1940s, because it is based
on arrangements underpinning trade and finance as linkages between
economies, but it ignores their physical interaction in the environmental
area. Now, with the growth of global negotiations on climate change, an
environmental regime is emerging, which raises the issue of how it will be
linked to trade and finance. But in turn, the negotiations in trade and finance
will have to be linked in terms of their potential impact on climate change.
Eventually, these two separate sets of negotiations would seemingly need to
be jointly linked, with joint bargaining across trade, finance, and global
environment. How this joint bargaining would occur, whether it would
evolve out of the WTO or by some other means, would also be a central
issue. So far, this sort of joint bargaining is not commonplace, even on a
small scale, with discussions on the national and international scale being
largely unsuccessful. The impact of the environment on matters of trade is
limited largely to emissions trading systems and the emergence of the green
industry. Outside of the established climate change funds, the impact on
finance is likewise limited to small scale investment mechanisms similar to
a rural farmer’s weather insurance.59
Finally, we have the issue of the institutional form for such negotiations.
The current round for climate change negotiations has taken place under the
UN and the UNFCCC, which in turn, has involved three central entities:
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC). There are many deficiencies in these institutional arrangements, as
has been widely noted in literature and more recently at the negotiating
table in Copenhagen. The WMO is not an organization centrally designed to
achieve internalization of externalities. The IPCC is a body whose
legitimacy, in terms of national membership, has been questioned and,
generally, the use of UN agencies in relatively remote geographical areas
with relatively small numbers of employees and limited expertise in
international negotiation (such as UNEP) is something that has been queried
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in terms of its satisfactory nature relative to the scale and importance of the
task at hand.
In turn, the issue arises as to whether the WTO itself will transform and
change from a world trade organization to, effectively, a world bargaining
organization. By building on its prior experience and involvement in trade
bargaining, it could become a form of world bargaining organization into
which environmental issues will be inserted in bargaining format, with the
transference of the bargaining we see in the current post-Kyoto negotiating
round being the first step. Whether these developments will occur remains
to be seen, but such options and prospects will also affect the outcome in
the post-Kyoto negotiating round, particularly if the reason for the slow
pace of progress seen in Copenhagen is decided to be the institutional
format these discussions are being conducted under.

1

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the CESifo Venice Summer Institute
as part of a session on “Europe and Global Environmental Negotiations.” We are grateful
to the Liebnitz Foundation for support, and to Ray Riezman, Carlo Carrero, Yuezhou Cai,
Yan Dong, and Hui Fang Tian for comments.
2
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI); University of Western
Ontario; CESifo.
3
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI).
4
See generally United Nations, Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Dec. 11, 1997), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
kpeng.pdf.
5
See generally UNFCCC, The United Nations Climate Change Conference in Bali
(2007), http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_13/items/4049.php.
6
See generally UNFCC Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further
Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol on its second session, at 6,
FCCC/KP/AWG/2006/4 (Dec. 14, 2006), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2006/awg2/eng/04.pdf.
7
See UNFCC Conference of the Parties, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Thirteenth Session, at 3–5, FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (March 14, 2008), available at
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf.
8
The text for all the agreements reached at Bali may be found at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf.
9
UNFCC Conference of the Parties, supra note 7, at 3–6.
10
Id. at 3–4.

VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 2 • 2010

813

814 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

11

See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, A REPORT OF
WORKING GROUP I OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE:
SUMMARY FOR POLICY MAKERS (Solomon et. al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf.
12
UNFCC Conference of the Parties, supra note 7, at 12–28.
13
Copenhagen Accord, para. 11, Dec. 18, 2009, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/
docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.pdf.
14
See infra Part III.F. (Part III.F. will briefly examine the largest funds).
15
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES 224 (2008)
(specifically, the BLUE scenario is estimated to cost $45 trillion to cut the 2005
emissions 50 percent).
16
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 194 (2009).
17
For more information, see Global Environment Facility, http://www.gefweb.org (last
visited Mar. 28, 2010) or GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, FOCAL AREA: CLIMATE
CHANGE (2009), http://www.gefweb.org/uploadedFiles/Publications/ClimateChange-FSJune2009.pdf.
18
See U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993.
19
See U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3.
20
See United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2010) (detailing
official UN talks in Bangkok, Bonn, and Accra, and numerous other talks that were
focused on more specific issues, such as details of funding arrangements, specific special
needs of particular developing countries, and discussion on how to mesh climate changerelated measures with existing international architecture, trade, and the WTO in
particular).
21
See generally LUDIVINE TAMIOTTI, ET AL., WTO-UNEP REPORT ON TRADE AND
CLIMATE CHANGE (2009). See the joint WTO-UNEP report on this issue for more indepth analysis, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_
climate_change_e.pdf.
22
John Whalley & Ben Zissimos, Trade and Environment Linkage and a Possible
World Environmental Organisation, 5 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 483, 510–16 (2000); see
generally John Whalley & Ben Zissimos, What Could a World Environmental
Organization Do?, 1 GLOBAL ENVTL. POLITICS 29 (2001).
23
One event that would cause a sufficient amount of worry and spur this type of action is
an ice-free Arctic. Depending on whom one asks, an ice-free Arctic is predicted to occur
anywhere between 2013 and 2050. Any climactic event of sufficient proportions to worry
people on a global scale may also spur action of some sort.
24
Elizabeth May, Yes We Can! Goes Global, GREEN PARTY OF CANADA, Dec. 12, 2008,
http://www.greenparty.ca/en/node/8755.
25
Nitin Sethi, Small Islands Group Force Break in Climate Talks, THE TIMES OF INDIA,
Dec. 10, 2009, available at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Small-islands-groupforce-break-in-climate-talks/articleshow/5320031.cms; John Vidal & Suzanne
Goldenberg, Copenhagen Talks Stall as African Bloc Accuses UN of Trying to Kill Kyoto,
GUARDIAN,
Dec.
14,
2009,
THE
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/14/copenhagen-g77-africa-kyotosuspended.

Post-Copenhagen Negotiation Issues and the North-South Divide

26

For the full text of the Accord, see http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/l07.
pdf.
27
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 13, at para. 4.
28
Id. at para. 5.
29
This issue has been agreed to be discussed again in Mexico, as lowering the threshold
of acceptable warming is an idea that caught many by surprise in Copenhagen. See id. at
para. 12.
30
See generally NICHOLAS HERBERT STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE (2006).
31
See generally Robert O. Mendelsohn, A Crtitique of the Stern Report, 29 REGULATION
42 (2006–2007); see also Francesco Bosello et al., Economy-Wide Estimates of the
Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise, 37 ENVTL. AND RESOURCE ECON. 549
(2006) (stating that similar estimates have been produced on a more global scale
concerning the effects of an increase in sea level).
32
See generally Ben Lockwood & John Whalley, Carbon Motivated Border Tax
Adjustments: Old Wine in Green Bottles? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 14025, 2008).
33
David Cronin, Climate Change: EU Gives Polluters a Christmas Gift, IPS, Dec. 12,
2009, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=45095.
34
See generally China.org.cn, China, India Sign Climate Pact, http://www.china.org.cn
/environment/2009-10/22/content_18745060.htm.
35
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 13, at para. 6; see generally CHARLIE PARKER, ET AL.,
THE LITTLE REDD BOOK (2009), http://www.globalcanopy.org/themedia/file/PDFs
/LRB_lowres/lrb_en.pdf.
36
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 13, at paras. 4 & 5.
37
Reuters, Asia; China Tops U.S. In Greenhouse Gas, Group Finds, N.Y. TIMES, June
21, 2007, at A12.
38
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 13, at para. 5.
39
While the Kyoto Protocol did not require developing countries to act, many in fact did
so. This was largely through the Clean Development Mechanism, which allocated
funding for green projects in developing countries. The reasons for this were varied. One
primary reason is that it provided an extra source of funds for infrastructure projects.
Another, particularly for China, was the political leverage of visibly acting to mitigate
their carbon, which is useful for any future negotiations. Another large reason was access
to new technology and the boost such technology could give to their development. And,
of course, there are also environmentally based motives.
40
See generally Sean Walsh & John Whalley, The Global Negotiating Framework for
Climate Change Mitigation (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2458, 2008). Note also that this
is not as advantageous to China as it may seem. As a developing nation, China is a large
importer of carbon-intensive goods, most notably building materials such as steel and
concrete, as well as a large exporter in various manufactured goods. The net effect would
thus be much less than simply writing off the 35 percent of Chinese emissions
attributable to exports and could potentially even increase the net level of emissions
China is accountable for.

VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 2 • 2010

815

816 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

41

UNFCCC, Changes in GHG emissions from 1990 to 2004 for Annex I Parties,
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/background_publications_htmlpdf/applicatio
n/pdf/ghg_table_06.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) [hereinafter UNFCCC Table on
Changes in GHG Emissions].
42
Information on the changes upcoming in Phase 3 of the EU ETS may be found in
several
EU
government
sites,
including
the
United
Kingdom,
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/what_we_do/change_energy/tackling_clima/emi
ssions/eu_ets/phase_iii/phase_iii.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2010).
43
Lockwood & Whalley supra note 32.
44
The Adaptation Fund is largely intended for projects in areas of the world where
climate change will first be felt, in order to lessen the impact of climate change over time.
Also, within those areas of the world, primary attention is given to developing countries.
Thus, in practice, much of the resources for the fund come from CDM projects.
45
The CTF is largely for research in green technologies and energy. However, in
keeping with the World Bank’s strengths, the main crux of the fund is that it offers both a
short-term action plan for carbon reduction that largely focuses on energy efficiency and
a longer-term green development plan based on deploying green energy technologies. As
previously stated, the estimated eventual size of the CTF is roughly $30 billion, with $5
billion initially used to get it moving.
46
The SCF is a pool of funds meant to fund some specific WB sanctioned projects such
as a developing country adaptation program as well as a project aimed at forest
preservation and renewal. Otherwise, its primary purpose is to serve as a source of
financing tools such as loans, credits, grants, etc., for the needs of developing countries.
Climate Investment Funds, Strategic Climate Fund, http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.
org/cif/node/3 (last visited Apr. 3, 2010).
47
Benito Müller, The Nairobi Climate Change Conference: A Breakthrough for
Adaptation Funding, Jan. 2007, at 2, available at http://www.oxfordenergy.org/pdfs/
comment_0107-1.pdf.
48
See generally GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, STATUS REPORT ON THE CLIMATE
CHANGE FUNDS (2008) (indicating that many smaller international funds are managed by
GEF).
49
This was more in the nature of a demand than a proposal due to the ‘Danish Text’
incident in Copenhagen, the proposal that would have abolished the current Kyoto
Protocol commitments. This was so objectionable that it caused a lengthy walkout en
masse by the developing countries. While the incident itself was highly covered in the
media, unfortunately the Danish Text itself is no longer public. Juliet Eilperin, Poor
Nations Stall Talks on Global Warming, THE WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 15, 2009, at A08.
50
The nature of climate science does not aid to clarify this, as it is difficult to progress
by any means but consensus, which may alter or be broken by any party as they see fit.
This was seen in the Copenhagen talks with the proposal to shift the target warming
threshold down to 1.5 degrees Celsius from 2 degrees Celsius, an issue thought to be
settled. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 13, at para. 12.
51
See supra Part III.B.
52
UNFCCC Table on Changes in GHG Emissions, supra note 41.

Post-Copenhagen Negotiation Issues and the North-South Divide

53

After developing countries returned from their walkout over the “Danish Text,” which
stipulated the pardoning of all Kyoto Commitments, all Annex I parties reaccepted their
Kyoto backlog in the Copenhagen Accord on top of an unspecified “deepening” of
commitments. However, this text is not legally binding in any way and getting Annex I
countries to take responsibility for their Kyoto backlog in a legally binding agreement
may prove to be a major source of contention in future negotiation. Developing countries
have more political capital on this issue since countries with a backlog are essentially
going back on their agreed and ratified international commitments, while countries with a
backlog are so far behind in some cases that it would be potentially economically ruinous
to meet their original Kyoto target. See Eilperin, supra note 49.
54
STERN, supra note 30.
55
Maggie Fox, Antarctic Glaciers Melting Faster-Study, REUTERS, Sept. 24, 2004,
http://www.planetark.com/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/27332/newsDate/24-Sep2004/story.htm.
56
Copenhagen Accord, supra note 13, at para. 12.
57
For more information, see the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657.
58
See generally Whalley & Zissimos, supra note 22, at 29–34.
59
It should be noted that the timescales of most of the events and consequences
surrounding climate change are fairly long. Thus, most climate-related financial
mechanisms that could work would be risky (due to uncertain effects or new revelations
in science) in the very long term—out to 2050 or further. Notably, the demand for this
sort of investment is small.

VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 2 • 2010

817

